Separating introduction effects from selectivity effects by Gralla, Rafael & Kraft, Kornelius
SFB 
823 
Separating introduction 
effects from selectivity 
effects: The differences in 
employment patterns of co-
determined firms 
 D
iscussion P
aper 
 
Rafael Gralla, Kornelius Kraft  
 
 
 
 
Nr. 43/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
Separating Introduction Effects from Selectivity Effects: The 
Differences in Employment Patterns of Co-Determined Firms 
 
Rafael Gralla* 
Kornelius Kraft** 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
This study examines differences in employment growth between firms with and 
without works councils by separating introduction effects from potential 
selectivity effects. Using a difference in differences framework, we show that 
firms with works councils have higher employment growth before establishing a 
works council. However, employment growth declines after introduction. We 
identify the reason for lower employment growth in reduced hiring rates but 
constant dismissal rates. 
 
Key Words: Works councils, hires, dismissals, employment growth, difference-
in-differences. 
 
JEL Classification: J53, J63, C23, M54. 
 
 This Version: October 2011 
                                                 
* Corresponding author; TU Dortmund, Department of Economics, Business and Social Science, 
Vogelpothsweg 87, D-44221 Dortmund, Phone: (+49)231/755-3156,  
e-mail: rafael.gralla@tu-dortmund.de. 
** TU Dortmund, ZEW Mannheim and IZA Bonn, kornelius.kraft@tu-dortmund.de. 
The authors thank the Research Data Centre at the Institute for Employment Research, 
Nuremberg for the provided data access. The financial support of the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (SFB 823,”Statistical modelling of nonlinear dynamic processes”) is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 2
1 Introduction 
The German Works Constitution Act defines the German method of co-
determination on establishment level. This Act determines the information, 
consultation and codetermination rights of works councils which represent 
employees. Among other codetermination rights, works councils have the power 
to affect decisions regarding hires and dismissals. It is even possible for them to 
oppose hires as well as dismissals in some cases.   
The effect of works councils on firms’ behavior has been examined several 
times since the mid-1980s (FitzRoy and Kraft 1985, 1987, 1990, Kraft 1986). 
These and subsequent studies analyze to what extent firms with and without 
works councils differ with respect to profitability, R&D, productivity, quits and 
employment1.  
A common feature of studies on works councils is that they ignore potential 
selectivity effects. Differences between firms have so far been explained by the 
existence of works councils, although it might be the case that some of these 
differences are not in fact caused by works councils. Specific characteristics 
may exist before a works council has been introduced and also favor the 
introduction of works councils. These specific characteristics may also affect 
some other variables. Therefore, the existence or introduction of a works 
council as well as differences in employment, hires and dismissals may be 
caused by an unobserved third variable. If this variable is constant over time, 
selectivity may seriously affect the results of existing studies. Even if the 
heterogeneity that encourages the establishment of a works council disappears 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Addison and Teixeira (2006) as well as Jirjahn (2008a, 2008b, 2010) 
regarding employment growth. Frick and Sadowski (1995), Backes-Gellner, Frick and Sadowski 
(1997), Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001) as well as Dilger (2002) examine hires and 
dismissals.  
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over time, the estimated effect of introducing a works council will be biased as 
long as no control for selectivity has been carried out. The estimation of 
adoption effects, given potential heterogeneity, is essentially the topic of this 
paper. 
Not many studies until now have considered the effects of works councils on 
employment growth. However the results have been discussed quite 
controversially. Although we cannot solve all problems, we argue that the 
comparison of firms before and after the adoption of a works council avoids 
many problems associated with a cross-sectional comparison of firms with and 
without such an institution. This ensures that the permanent differences 
between firms which at some point in time adopt a works council are not mixed 
up with the actual effects of a works council, and the causal interpretation is 
much clearer.  
The results of this study are probably of use beyond the German context, since 
works councils have interesting and exceptional codetermination rights on 
employment which are not matched by rights that unions in other countries 
possess. This study tries to document the effects of such codetermination on 
employment. 
To analyze in more detail the ways in which employment adjustment is realized, 
we also look at hiring and dismissal rates. We find that firms which introduce a 
works council have higher employment growth rates before the introduction 
actually takes place. However, after introduction, firms with works councils have 
lower employment growth – which in turn is the result of lower hiring rates. 
However, we find that the introduction of works councils has no significant 
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influence on dismissals. Instead, firms in which a works council is introduced 
already have lower dismissal rates. 
This paper is organized as follows: firstly we summarize the theoretical 
background (section 2) and the results of previous empirical studies on the 
impact of works councils (section 3). In section 4, we describe our methodology 
and the dataset. Next, we discuss our results regarding employment growth 
(section 5), hires and dismissals (section 6). Finally, with section 6 we draw our 
conclusion. 
 
2 Theoretical background 
The German Works Constitution Act increases workers’ power by conceding 
rights to co-determination when a company hires and dismisses staff, whereby 
their power depends on the number of employees in an establishment. 
Irrespective of establishment size, works councils have to be informed in 
advance of a dismissal. A works council cannot oppose a dismissal without 
good reason. Possible reasons for intervention are when it appears that social 
issues have been neglected in the selection of employees for dismissal, or 
when further employment might in fact be feasible (perhaps after retraining or 
relocation within the establishment). If an establishment has more than 20 
employees, the works council has extended codetermination rights. Among 
other things, works councils have to participate in decisions on large-scale 
redundancies, hires, and the classification of employees into particular wage 
brackets of collective bargaining agreements2. 
                                                 
2 See Pulte (2009) for a description of the link between codetermination rights and 
establishment size. 
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In the case of large-scale redundancies, managers negotiate a so-called social 
plan (Sozialplan) with works councils which determines redundancy payments, 
social selection criteria regarding who will be made redundant and the 
establishing of an interim employment company (Transfergesellschaft). If a 
works council exists, dismissed employees usually change from their previous 
establishment to such a company where they obtain a fixed-term contract. For 
the duration of this contract the company pays for and provides additional 
training to the employees in order to decrease the likelihood of their becoming 
unemployed.    
Even if dismissals cannot be avoided in the end, a delay is more probable and 
this clearly has effects on adjustment costs.  
In the case of hires, works councils are able to refuse a hiring if, for example, it 
endangers the “peaceful atmosphere in an establishment” (Betriebsfrieden), 
threatens the jobs of permanent staff or causes other, unjustified 
disadvantages. For obvious reasons dismissals are much more frequently 
opposed than hires.  
Theoretical discussion about possible employment effects of works councils is 
very controversial. The theories which are relevant within the given context are 
participation theory, the neoclassical approach (with the variants insider-
outsider theory and rent-seeking theory) and the employment security view3. On 
the one hand, participation theorists argue that works councils improve the 
relationship between employer and employee due to better communication. 
This is basically an application of the exit-voice theory of Freeman and Medoff 
(1984). Better communication helps to avoid misunderstandings and to solve 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed theoretical discussion from different perspectives, see inter alia, Addison, 
Schnabel and Wagner (2001), Dilger (2003) as well as Jirjahn (2010).  
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problems at the workplace. This in turn has a positive influence on job 
satisfaction and productivity which also affects dismissals (Backes-Gellner, 
Frick and Sadowski 1997). Additionally, works councils improve communication 
with regard to work practices (Backes-Gellner, Jirjahn and Mohrenweiser 2011).  
The basic idea is that information asymmetries between employees and the 
management exist. Employees are able to identify, for example, potential 
technical or organizational improvements. However, inadequate communication 
channels or anxiety about possible job losses following rationalization measures 
prevents workers from disclosing (private) information. The explicit task of 
works councils is (among other aims) the exchange of information with 
management and to protect employees from any negative implications of this 
information disclosure. If the introduction of a works council enhances efficiency 
and implied productivity advantages lead to price reductions, demand for the 
produced output will increase, the number of dismissals will probably fall and 
hires will increase.  
On the other hand, based on a neoclassical point of view, it is maintained that 
bargaining power and codetermination rights of works councils constrain the 
profit-maximizing behavior of the management. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1979), the standard argument goes as follows: if works councils are 
such a good thing, why does the legislator exclude the employer from the  
decision of whether to introduce a works council? Related to that argumentation 
is the observation that in no other country do workers’ representatives have so 
much power as in Germany. If codetermination enhanced efficiency, other 
countries would have adopted such an institution too. The insider-outsider 
theory (Lindbeck and Snower 1988, 2001) argues that employed insiders have 
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an advantage in bargaining compared with unemployed outsiders because of 
firm-specific advantages and the possibility of hampering cooperation with 
newly hired workers via harassment. Works councils could be interpreted as 
institutionalized insider representation, as they are surely not responsible for the 
interests of outsiders. Another strand of literature (c.f. for a recent example 
Beckman, Föhr and Kräkel 2010) emphasizes that the introduction of works 
councils aims at increasing bargaining power and therefore this institution is 
regarded as a rent-seeking entity. Information, consultation and codetermination 
rights of works councils are assumed to prevent or at least delay necessary 
decisions if these decisions are not in the workers’ interest. One obvious 
example is the case of dismissals. The power of works councils to affect 
decisions on redundancy payments and the selection among the employees to 
be dismissed according to social criteria will increase employment (adjustment) 
costs. Therefore, profits may be negatively affected by the existence of works 
councils (Frege 2002), at least as long as no counteracting efficiency effects are 
connected with the introduction of works councils. If this theory is true, such 
firms experience lower employment growth rates in the long run, as they have 
cost disadvantages in comparison to otherwise identical organizations.  
An alternative explanation for the parallel observation of the introduction of a 
works council and lower employment growth rate is the following: as stated 
above, works councils are of particular help for employees if redundancies take 
place. If - for exogenous reasons - economic conditions become worse, the 
workforce might decide to adopt a works council in order to be better prepared 
for possible negotiations about the conditions and extent of dismissals (Jirjahn 
2009, Kraft and Lang 2008). Thus, works councils may be the result of 
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pessimistic expectations about the future. If these concerns become real, we 
will simultaneously observe the adoption of a works council and, in an extreme 
case, an increase in dismissals. However, in this scenario the presence of a 
works council would not cause dismissals. The main motivation to introduce 
works councils is its expected effect of employment security. 
This theory is difficult to test empirically, since information on expectations is 
needed. Implications are that the adoption of a works council is negatively 
correlated with performance.  
In contrast, if expected profitability and adoption probability are uncorrelated or 
even show a positive relation, a works council is not introduced in times of 
worsening economic conditions. The reason then is probably rent seeking 
(Beckmann, Föhr and Kräkel 2010).  
 
3 Related Literature 
The effects of works councils on firm behavior and performance have been 
examined empirically in several studies. The main focus of this field of research 
is the impact of works councils on factors like productivity, innovations, 
profitability and labor turnover. Frege (2002) as well as Addison, Schnabel and 
Wagner (2004) survey previous studies. Furthermore, Jirjahn (2011) surveys 
studies of German codetermination rights on company- and establishment- 
level. Our study confines itself to employment growth, hires and dismissals. In 
an early work, Gold (1999) estimates the effect of works councils on 
employment using data from the production sector of Lower Saxony. He finds 
that works councils reduce changes in employment. He also finds that firms with 
works councils more frequently complain of high dismissal costs and are also 
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grossly overstaffed. Gerlach and Jirjahn (1999), however, use the same data 
and find no significant influence of works councils on employment growth. 
Addison and Teixeira (2006) show that works councils reduce employment 
growth. Relating to these results, Jirjahn (2008a) argues that the estimated 
effects of works councils on employment growth strongly depend on the 
modeling of firm size. He claims that works councils do not influence 
employment growth. He proves his hypothesis by showing that the effects of 
works councils indeed vary if different methods of specifying firm size are used. 
Furthermore, Jirjahn (2010) finds a positive effect of the existence of a works 
council on employment growth for manufacturing establishments in Lower 
Saxony. 
Compared with employment growth, results on the influence of works councils 
on hires and dismissals are less conflicting. In an early work, Frick and 
Sadowski (1995) show that the existence of a works council reduces dismissals 
significantly. They also find a negative effect on hires, although not a significant 
one. Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001) find that works councils 
significantly reduce hires, separations and labor turnover in general, although 
this result does not apply to firms with 21 to 100 employees. Dilger (2002) 
shows that works councils reduce hires and separations. According to his 
results the extent of reduction depends on the characteristics of the works 
councils. Cooperative works councils induce the highest reductions. Works 
councils which do not intervene in day-to-day business do not have a significant 
effect at all. Backes-Gellner, Frick and Sadowski (1997) compare the dismissal 
rates of firms caused by the existence of works councils. They show that the 
dismissal rate in firms with works councils is 2.9 percentage points lower than in 
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firms without such an institution. They also find some evidence that works 
councils neither prevent dismissals in bad economic situations nor inhibit hires 
in growing firms.  
Ellguth (2006) uses a propensity-scores-matching approach to identify 
differences in labor fluctuation. Using cross-sectional data, he finds that works 
councils reduce labor turnover. Although lower turnover is explained by a 
reduction in hires and dismissals, fewer hires dominate his results. However, he 
does not estimate introduction effects. Furthermore, the strong correlation 
between establishment size and the existence of a works council reduces the 
general validity of his results as the majority of large establishments have a 
works council. So it is hardly possible to match these firms with other, similar 
firms without a works council. Guertzgen (2007) shows that works councils can 
be associated with lower accession and separation rates. Her definition of the 
dependent variables and the estimation procedure is quite similar to our study. 
However, she does not distinguish between quits and dismissals and the 
relation between works councils and hires/dismissals is not the main purpose of 
her study.  
A common feature of the studies mentioned above is that they ignore the 
potential endogeneity of the introduction of a works council. Jirjahn (2009) as 
well as Kraft and Lang (2008) find that employees prefer to introduce works 
councils to secure their rents. Additionally, Kraft and Lang (2008) show that 
employees prefer to introduce a works council if they are worried about potential 
job losses. The adoption of a works council in turn is associated with less 
anxiety about becoming unemployed. However, Beckmann, Föhr and Kräkel 
(2010) show that works councils are mainly adopted in order to seek rents 
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instead of sustain jobs. These studies highlight that firms with certain 
characteristics are more likely to adopt a works council than others. The only 
studies that examine adoption effects are Addison et al. (2002) and Schultz 
(2006). These studies use a propensity-score-matching approach and find no 
significant effects on differences in quits, productivity, employment growth, 
profits (Addison et al., 2002) as well as productivity, profitability and qualification 
(Schultz 2006). However, their results might be inconclusive because the 
introduction of a works council is a rare event and therefore usually only a small 
number of observations is available.  
 
4 Data & Method 
Our data is taken from the IAB Establishment Panel, which is an annual survey 
of more than 15,000 German establishments with at least one employee 
covered by social insurance. This survey is collected by the Institute for 
Employment Research of the German Federal Employment Agency, 
Nuremberg. We use survey waves of the years 1998 to 2008. The advantage of 
this data is that it covers a long time period. Hence, our results should not be 
driven by cyclical up- or downturns but rather include whole business cycles. At 
first, we drop all observations with less than five employees as the introduction 
of a works council is only relevant for firms with more than four employees. We 
also drop observations from companies where a works council has been 
abandoned, and observations from the public service, non-profit organizations 
as well as households. Overall, our sample contains 54,504 observations of 
16,149 establishments. In this sample, we observe 242 adoptions of a works 
council. We also generate a subsample which only includes establishments with 
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more than 20 employees in order to control for the robustness of our results. As 
already mentioned above, works councils have stronger codetermination rights 
if an establishment has more than 20 employees. This subsample contains 
31,907 observations of 9,874 establishments and 187 adoptions of works 
councils. 
 
4.1 Variables 
Our estimates can be divided into two parts. We start by estimating the effect of 
introducing a works council on employment growth. The growth rate is defined 
as i,t 1 i,t 1 i,td ln EMP ln EMP ln EMP   . In the second part, we estimate the effect 
of the introduction of works councils on hires and dismissals. The idea of this 
approach is to find an explanation for changes in employment growth by 
identifying potential changes in hires and dismissals4.  
We define our dependent variables as the ratio of hires (dismissals) in t+1 and 
overall employment in t. However, the exact recording of dismissals may be 
complicated. To repeat, the aim of this study is to define the effect of works 
councils on the decision of the management whether it wants to dismiss one or 
more employee(s) or not. This dismissal can be done in several ways. For 
example, aside of a classical firing, the firm can also renounce the extension of 
a fixed-term contract or reject further employment after an apprenticeship has 
been completed. Furthermore, management is also able to reduce employment 
within a firm by establishing interim employment companies. In this case 
                                                 
4 We also tried to estimate equations with quit rates as the dependent variable, but 
unfortunately the computations did not converge.  
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employees usually terminate their employment contracts by mutual consent 
and get a new fixed-term contract in the interim employment company. Such a 
company can be seen as an independent organization within the same firm 
which has the purpose of financing and organizing application training courses 
or computer training courses, etc. to improve an individual’s chances of finding 
alternative employment. 
In order to define adequately what a dismissal is, we decide to specify our 
dismissal rate of firm i in year t+1 as  
  Jan June,i,t 1Jan-June,i,t+1
June,i,t
100SHAREdiss
Employment
 (1) 
where Jan June ,i ,t 1   is defined as the sum of changes in employment through 
dismissals, termination of employment contracts by mutual consent, leaving the 
firm after apprenticeship or after a fixed-term contract has expired. Similarly, we 
define the share of hires as  
  Jan June,i,t 1Jan-June,i,t+1
June,i,t
100 HiresSHAREhires
Employment
  (2) 
 
We restrict the share of hires and dismissals, respectively, to the first half-year 
because the survey only requests the information for this period. 
 
4.2 Explanatory Variables 
An influence of unions on employment change can be expected, i.e. the 
existence of collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, we create a dummy 
COLLAGR to account for this influence. We add a variable QUALI to our model 
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to measure labor qualification effects. This variable is defined as the number of 
employees with a vocational degree and the number of employees with a 
university degree divided by total employment. Of course, this is a broad 
definition of qualification. It covers 68 % of the employees in our sample. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to divide employees into more precise qualification 
groups because the respective question in the survey has been changed during 
our sample period.  
Furthermore, we add the variables PART to consider the effects of part-time 
working and FIXTERM to consider the effect of fixed-term contracts. Both 
variables may be associated with higher labor turnover in firms. There is a 
strong correlation between firm size and the introduction of a works council. It 
may also be possible that large firms have different dismissal and hiring rates 
caused by internal manning procedures. Additionally, large firms might have 
different employment growth patterns. Therefore, we include several size 
dummies to avoid a potentially omitted variable bias.  
Clearly, employment and employment changes are determined to a large extent 
by demand for the produced goods. Output is probably an endogenously 
determined variable and therefore we refrain from using it. We could use lagged 
values of output growth. However, this would lead to a substantial reduction in 
the number of observations. Less problematic seems to be the use of two 
innovation dummies (PRODimp and PRODnew) as alternative and exogenous 
variables describing growth potential. The variables in question have unit values 
if the firm improved an existing product (PRODimp) or introduced a new product 
(PRODnew). Unfortunately, the IAB Establishment Panel does not include the 
respective questions regularly, but only in the years 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 
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and 2008. Therefore, we impute the missing observations. As a proxy for 
capacity utilization, we also insert the variable PROFITS in our model5. 
Insufficient profits are (in the presence of fixed costs) usually the result of an 
unsatisfying capacity utilization. Hence, employment reduction is probable.  
The IAB Establishment Panel contains assessments of the profit situation by the 
management of an establishment measured according to a Likert scale6. We 
use this information to generate a dummy PROFITS that has unit value if the 
management of the establishment assesses the profit situation as 4 or 5, i.e. if it 
rates the profit situation as bad or very bad. We also consider the influence of 
plant technology by using a dummy DTECH which has unit value if the 
management assesses the conditions of technical facilities as 1 or 2 on a scale 
of 1 (up to date) to 5 (obsolete). Moreover, we add a dummy for the age of a 
firm (AGE) which has unit value if the firm was founded before 19907.  
 
  
                                                 
5 It could be argued that profits are the result of economic activity and not the cause. However 
several studies use profits a variable explaining employment growth. Excluding this variable 
does not alter our results. See, e.g., Gold (1999) and Dilger (2002) for a discussion on the 
effects of low profits on employment. 
6 The Likert scale contains a subjective rating of profitability beginning 1 (very good) until 5 (very 
bad). 
7 The IAB panel does not contain more detailed information on foundation date if an 
establishment was founded before 1990.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable     Mean Std. Dev. 
dlnEMP    -0.018     0.164 
SHAREhires      5.138   10.020 
SHAREdismiss      2.556     6.484 
WoCo      0.337     0.473 
WoCoint     0.010     0.097 
WoCotreat     0.019     0.136 
WoCoall     0.328     0.469 
PRODimp     0.459     0.498 
PRODnew     0.112     0.316 
DTECH     0.702     0.457 
PROFIT     0.299     0.458 
COLLAGR     0.536     0.499 
LIMITED     0.655     0.475 
SINGLE     0.743     0.437 
QUALI     0.680     0.258 
PART     0.161     0.214 
FIXTERM     0.042     0.105 
AGE     0.566     0.496 
DSIZE5-20     0.415     0.493 
DSIZE21-50     0.206     0.405 
DSIZE51-100     0.119     0.324 
DSIZE101-250     0.128     0.334 
DSIZE251-500     0.069     0.253 
DSIZE>500     0.063     0.243 
No. of emp. 130.362 295.915 
No. of estab. 16,149 
No. of obs. 54,504 
 
Older firms may have structures that reduce labor turnover and may also be 
active in more stable markets. We also take account of the legal form of firms 
by the variable LIMIT, which has unit value if the firm in question is managed 
with limited liability. Limited liability could motivate the management to invest in 
more risky but highly profitable projects so that employment growth might 
increase. Moreover, we add a dummy variable SINGLE if the establishment is a 
single-plant company. We also add industry and time dummies to control for 
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industry- and time-specific effects. Clearly differences between East and West 
Germany may exist. We therefore include dummies for the German 
Bundesländer, which are comparable to states in other countries. Table 1 
displays the descriptive statistics of our data. 
 
4.3 Measuring the effect of works councils 
In order to estimate the effect of works councils, we introduce in the first step a 
dummy variable for their existence (WoCo). This is the common method that 
has been used in several studies. Of course, this method neither estimates the 
effect of the introduction of a works council nor does it account for potential 
endogeneity of the introduction of works councils. It simply shows the difference 
between firms which have a works council and firms without it. In the next step, 
in order to distinguish between potential heterogeneity among firms and the 
effect of works councils, we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework. 
This specification includes three dummies instead of one compared with the 
previous version. Hence, our estimation equation becomes  
 
          i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t 1 i,t 2 i,t i,ty WoCoint WoCotreat WoCoall X T  (3) 
 
The dummy WoCotreat identifies the treatment group and has unit value in 
every year if an establishment introduces a works council during the 
observation period, irrespective of whether it is actually introduced or not. The 
purpose of this dummy is to characterize the heterogeneity between our 
treatment group and firms without works councils. The dummy WoCoint has unit 
value if WoCotreat has unit value and a works council actually exists (i.e 
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WoCoint=WoCotreat WoCo ). This dummy variable identifies the effect of 
the introduction of a works council. Finally, a group of firms exists that have a 
works council during the whole observation period. We account for this group by 
inserting a dummy WoCoall, which has unit value if the firm has introduced a 
works council at some point in time before the first period that we observe (i.e.
WoCoall=WoCo-WoCoint ). This variable captures the impact of pre-existent 
works councils and its coefficient can be interpreted as the sum of 
heterogeneity, introduction and long-run effect. Hence, ignoring WoCoall would 
underestimate the effects of WoCoint and WoCotreat. Altogether, we have three 
groups of firms: firms without a works council (our control group), firms that 
introduced a works council (the treatment group) and firms that have a works 
council during all periods that we observe. This approach enables us to 
estimate different employment policies of firms with and without works councils 
and to check whether observed differences are caused by the actual 
introduction of a works council or are due to the heterogeneous characteristics 
of the firm.  
 
5 Works councils and employment growth 
Table 2 shows the results of OLS estimates of employment growth. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered. The first column contains the results of a 
regression, where a dummy variable WoCo stands for the existence of a works 
council. In line with the results of Addison and Teixeira (2006) the existence of a 
works council reduces employment growth. Jirjahn (2008a) criticized that an 
inadequate modeling of firm size leads to biased estimates of effects of works 
councils on employment growth. Therefore, we use size dummies to measure 
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size effects. Dummies have the advantage that they are able to detect 
nonlinearities as well as kinks in size effects. We also experimented with 
alternative measures of firm size8. None of our results were affected. The 
coefficients of our size dummies indicate a negative relation between size and 
growth so that a size bias, as mentioned by Jirjahn (2008a), can be rejected.    
The second column shows the results of the DiD approach. In this case firms 
which introduce a works council can be described by a specific pattern. These 
firms have a higher employment growth rate before introduction. However, after 
introduction employment growth is reduced and the initially higher rate 
disappears.  
As already mentioned above, works councils obtain additional codetermination 
rights if an establishment has more than 20 employees. Hence, we repeat our 
estimates with a subsample that only contains establishments with more than 
20 employees. The last two columns in table 3 show these results. The 
estimated coefficients in these columns are quite similar to the previous results.  
In principle the sum of the coefficients of WoCoint and WoCotreat should be 
equal to the coefficient of WoCoall, as the latter variable estimates both effects. 
A difference between WoCoall and the sum of WoCoint and WoCotreat could 
also point to a difference between the short-run and the long-run effect. Backes-
Gellner, Jirjahn and Mohrenweiser (2011) show that the influence of a works 
council increases over time, which they explain by a “learning effect”. Hence, 
the long-run effect of a works council is stronger than the short-run impact, and 
this is probably reflected by the difference between WoCoall and the sum of 
WoCoint and WoCotreat. In principle we could expand our DiD model by 
                                                 
8 That is, we used ln(EMP), EMP and EMP2 as well as solely EMP as a measurement of size.  
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including lagged variables of WoCoint in order to identify development over 
time. However, unfortunately, our sample does not allow us to estimate 
meaningful long-run effects due to the relatively short time horizon that we 
observe. On average, we observe an establishment 2.1 years before and 2.2 
years after a works council has been adopted. In addition, Backes-Gellner, 
Jirjahn and Mohrenweiser (2011) show that the aforementioned “learning effect” 
implies a very slow increase in power. For example, in their dataset works 
councils have the strongest impact after 30 years of existence.  The coefficients 
of WoCoint and WoCotreat on the one hand and WoCo on the other hand are 
statistically insignificant from zero at common levels of significance9. This result 
leads to two different conclusions. At first, we find no learning effect because 
the sum of Wocoint and WoCotreat does not differ from WoCoall. Secondly, our 
results cast some doubt on the employment security hypothesis after a temporal 
shock. If an expected negative shock in demand leads to the introduction of a 
works council and the sum of WoCoint and WoCotreat does not differ from 
WoCoall, this implies that the firms introducing works councils never recover 
from the initial negative shock. This may be the case for some firms, but is 
rather unlikely for the average of our sample. Hence, these results are more 
plausibly explained by the neoclassical theory, where the management adjusts 
employment growth as a reaction to a new situation with higher labor 
(adjustment) costs.      
Nor do the results support the participation theory, as the companies which 
introduce works councils do much worse than before.  
 
                                                 
9 The p-values of the H0: ߚௐ௢஼௢௜௡௧ ൅ ߚௐ௢஼௢௧௥௘௔௧ ൌ ߚௐ௢஼௢௔௟௟ are p1 = 0.930 in the first and p2 = 
0.498 in the second sample. 
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Table 2: OLS with employment growth as dep. variable 
 Pooled OLS  DiD OLS  Pooled OLS  DiD OLS  
Dep. Var. dln(EMP) dln(EMP) dln(EMP) dln(EMP) 
Estab. size N > 4 N > 4 N > 20 N > 20 
Variables Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
WoCo  -0.009***    -0.010***   
WoCoint    -0.028***    -0.025** 
WoCotreat     0.020***    -0.020** 
WoCoall    -0.008***    -0.009*** 
PRODimp   0.015***   0.015***   0.013***   0.013** 
PRODnew   0.007***  -0.008***   0.008***   0.008*** 
PROFIT  -0.059***  -0.059***  -0.054***  -0.054*** 
DTECH   0.010***   0.010***   0.010***   0.010*** 
COLLAGR  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003  -0.003 
LIMITED   0.010***   0.010***   0.006**   0.006** 
SINGLE   0.004**   0.005***   0.006***   0.006*** 
QUALI   0.009***   0.009**   0.007   0.007 
PART  -0.000  -0.000   0.000   0.000 
FIXTERM  -0.004  -0.004  -0.011  -0.011 
AGE  -0.008***  -0.008***  -0.010***  -0.010*** 
DSIZE 21-50   0.008**   0.008***    Ref.    Ref. 
DSIZE 51-100   0.010**   0.010***   0.003   0.003 
DSIZE 101-250   0.004   0.003  -0.001  -0.002 
DSIZE 251-500   0.001   0.001  -0.003  -0.003 
DSIZE >500  -0.007**  -0.008**  -0.011***  -0.011*** 
St/T/I Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 54,504 31,907 
R-squared       0.06          0.06 0.07 0.07 
 
Notes, * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. St/T/I describes 
state, time and industry dummies.   
 
 
6 What explains changes in employment growth? 
In a last step, we try to find the link between changes in employment growth 
and the employer’s decisions on hires and dismissals following the introduction 
of a works council. In doing so, we estimate the impact of the introduction of a 
works council within our DiD framework as explained above. Of course, many 
firms do not hire or dismiss any employees at all during a period, i.e. a large 
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share of our dependent variables is zero. Therefore, we apply a 
heteroscedasticity adjusted Tobit Model to take account of this censored data 
structure. For this purpose, we replace the variance 2  in the log likelihood 
function by the expression 2 2 2i i[exp(w ' )]    , where   denotes estimated 
parameters of the heteroscedasticity term and iw '  is a vector of several size 
and industry dummies10. Table 3 shows the estimated results of determinants of 
hires. The last row contains 2 - and p-values of LR tests on heteroscedasticity. 
These tests always reject the assumption of homoscedasticity and therefore the 
heteroscedasticity model is the relevant one. 
The conventional approach leads to the by now well-known result: firms with 
works councils hire fewer employees. We find a semi-elasticity of -0.237 in this 
approach11. Clearly, this effect is dominated by establishments with experienced 
works councils and does not identify introduction effects. The DiD approach, 
however, shows that the actual introduction of a works council reduces hires. 
The semi-elasticity of the adoption effect is -0.189 and is still significant at 5%-
level. Hence, the introduction of a works council reduces the share of hires by 
18.9% in the large sample (EMP > 4) and we also find a reduction of 23.0% in 
the small sample (EMP > 20). Using the DiD approach, we also find no 
significant differences in hires between treatment group establishments before 
introduction and establishments which do not adopt a works council. That is, we 
find no heterogeneity in hires between firms that will introduce a works council 
in later periods and firms that never adopt a works council. Additionally, the null 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Greene (2008) for a detailed discussion on heteroscedasticity in Tobit 
Models and methods to estimate unbiased coefficients. 
11 Here and throughout we evaluate average semi-elasticities of our works council dummies 
given that the dependent variable is positive. Semi-elasticities are defined as E(ln(y)|d=1)- 
E(ln(y)|d=0). 
 23
hypothesis H0: WoCoint + WoCotreat = WoCoall cannot be rejected12. Hence, 
the short-run impact of works councils on hires is quite similar to the long run 
effect. 
Table 3: heteroscedastic Tobit model with share of hires as dep. variable 
 Pooled  Het. Tobit  
DiD 
Het. Tobit  
Pooled  
Het. Tobit  
DiD  
Het. Tobit  
Dep. Var. SHAREhires SHAREhires SHAREhires SHAREhires 
Estab. Size N > 4 N > 4 N > 20 N > 20 
Variables Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
WoCo   -2.180*** [-0.237***] 
 
 
 
   -2.040*** [-0.293***] 
 
 
 
 
WoCoint    
 -1.743** 
[-0.189**] 
 
   
 -1.605** 
[-0.230**] 
 
WoCotreat    
 -0.360 
[-0.039] 
 
    -0.416 [-0.060] 
WoCoall    
 -2.202*** 
[-0.239***]
 
   
 -2.060*** 
[-0.296***]
 
PRODimp    0.583***    0.582***    0.451***    0.450*** 
PRODnew    0.581***    0.582***    0.525***    0.525*** 
PROFIT   -1.276***   -1.275***   -1.137***   -1.135*** 
DTECH    0.097    0.096    0.103    0.102 
COLLAGR   -1.340***   -1.386***   -1.413***   -1.411*** 
LIMITED    0.818***    0.820***    0.609***    0.611*** 
SINGLE    0.133    0.131    0.179*    0.177* 
QUALI   -0.791***   -0.790***   -0.704**   -0.703** 
PART    1.059*    1.057*    0.842    0.830 
FIXTERM  23.326***  23.327***  21.458***  21.464*** 
AGE   -1.463***  -1.463***  -1.195***  -1.195*** 
T/I/Si/St         Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 54,504 31,907 
LR-Test  
(P-Value) 
18,414.81 
(0.000) 
18,411.78 
(0.000) 
10,120.28 
(0.000) 
10,116.54 
(0.000) 
 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. T/I/Si/St describes 
time, industry, size and state dummies. Expressions in squared brackets are semi-elasticities. 
Standard errors of the semi-elasticities are calculated by the delta method. 
 
                                                 
12 The p-values of this test are 0.876 in the large and 0.951 in the small sample. 
 24
Table 4 illustrates the results of the estimations on dismissals. The LR Test 
again rejects the hypothesis of homoscedasticity. The estimates of pooled Tobit 
show a reduced share of dismissals in firms with works councils. However, 
using the DiD approach, it turns out that the introduction of a works council does 
not affect dismissals. In this case, firms which introduce a works council during 
the sample period generally have lower dismissal rates before adoption. Now, 
WoCotreat explains the difference between firms with and without works 
councils. The estimated average semi-elasticities of hires are -0.217 in the large 
and -0.254 in the small sample. That is, shares of dismissals in firms which 
introduce a works council are 21.7% and 25.4% lower than dismissal rates in 
firms without works councils. Both average marginal effects are also 
significantly different from zero at 5%-level.  
Based on the DiD estimation we conclude: before adoption, firms do not differ 
with regard to the hiring rate but have a lower dismissal rate compared with 
establishments without works councils. The introduction itself does not change 
dismissals but has a negative impact on hiring behavior13.  
                                                 
13 It could be argued that a part of the reduction in hires is a result of lower quit rates. If works 
councils were to reduce quits, the management would diminish hires because the number of 
vacancies is reduced. However, our results regarding employment growth point out that the 
hiring effect has to overcompensate a potential quit effect. Otherwise, a reduction in 
employment growth should not be observed.   
 25
Table 4: heteroscedastic Tobit model with share of dismissals as dep. variable 
 Pooled  Het. Tobit  
DiD 
Het. Tobit  
Pooled  
Het. Tobit  
DiD  
Het. Tobit  
Dep. Var. SHAREdismiss SHAREdismiss SHAREdismiss SHAREdismiss
Estab. Size N > 4 N > 4 N > 20 N > 20 
Variables Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
WoCo   -0.933*** [-0.136***] 
 
 
 
   -0.786*** [-0.159***]   
WoCoint    
 -0.356 
[-0.052] 
 
    -0.454 [-0.092] 
WoCotreat    
 -1.489*** 
[-0.217***] 
 
    -1.259** [-0.254**] 
WoCoall    
 -0.974*** 
[-0.142***] 
 
    -0.818*** [-0.165***] 
PRODimp   -0.121   -0.128   -0.146   -0.154 
PRODnew   -0.028    0.030    0.021    0.023 
PROFIT    1.447***    1.453***    1.295***    1.301*** 
DTECH   -0.593***   -0.594***   -0.543***   -0.544*** 
COLLAGR   -0.297***   -0.306***   -0.361***   -0.372*** 
LIMITED    0.338***    0.343***    0.250**    0.255** 
SINGLE   -0.095   -0.100   -0.100   -0.104 
QUALI   -1.406***   -1.412***   -1.244***   -1.253*** 
PART    0.107    0.077    0.229    0.197 
FIXTERM  14.361***  14.442***  12.966***  13.054*** 
AGE   -0.340***   -0.348***   -0.212*   -0.221** 
T/I/Si/St         Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes 
No. of obs. 54,504 31,907 
LR-Test  
(P-Value) 
17,714.44 
(0.000) 
17,720.64 
(0.000) 
8,852.62 
(0.000) 
8,857.12 
(0.000) 
 
Notes: * statistically significant at 0.10 level; ** at 0.05 level; *** at 0.01 level. T/I/Si/St describes 
time, industry, size and state dummies. Expressions in squared brackets are semi-elasticities. 
Standard errors of the semi-elasticities are calculated by the delta method.   
 
To sum up, the impact of works councils takes place by affecting hires and not, 
as perhaps expected, by reducing dismissals. How can our findings be 
explained? In our view, these results are in accordance with two rival 
explanations, but one of the two is more likely. Of course, a works council has 
the legal power to inhibit hires, but apparently they oppose hires rather rarely in 
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practice. More plausible is an intervention if dismissals are planned. Generally, 
works councils are able to increase dismissal costs by claiming high 
redundancy payments or simply by avoiding or at least delaying dismissals. 
One possible explanation for the observed effect on hires is the anticipation of 
increased dismissal costs if a works council exists and the termination of 
contracts is economically necessary. The co-determination rights of works 
councils might lead employers to reduce hiring rates because of the extended 
dismissal protection rights and a shift of bargaining power to the employees. 
This explanation is also consistent with the insider-outsider theory. Insiders 
raise dismissal costs by introducing works councils. Hence, employers react to 
the existence of works councils by not filling vacancies. 
However, we already discussed the alternative possibility that the workforce 
introduces a works council if it is worried about the economic perspectives of 
the firm. If these concerns become true, fewer hires will take place in the next 
period.  
The similar magnitude of the short- and long-run effect of a works council casts 
doubt on the relevance of this theory. The employment security models would 
only be valid if the shock leading to the introduction of a works council continues 
for all periods we observe.  
The results do not, however, support the hypothesis of participation theory that 
efficiency is improved by the introduction of a works council. We estimate lower 
employment growth after the adoption of a works council, which is inconsistent 
with improvements to efficiency, at least if labor costs do not rise more than 
productivity.    
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7 Conclusion 
We show that differences between firms with and without works councils 
regarding their employment growth, hiring and dismissal behavior are not only 
caused by the existence of works councils. In general, firms with works councils 
hire and dismiss less and also have a lower employment growth than firms 
without works councils. Taking account of the potential heterogeneity of firms 
and estimating the effect of an introduction of works councils by a difference-in-
differences approach, we show that the adoption of a works council is 
associated with fewer hires. However, works councils do not affect the share of 
dismissals. Consistently, we also find a reduced employment growth after 
introduction.  
We discuss three possible explanations for the reported empirical results. The 
neoclassical view with its variants insider maximization and rent seeking, 
employment security modeling and participation theory are relevant with respect 
to the analysis of the effects of works councils. In our view, the neoclassical 
approach explains the observed results more convincingly than the other 
theories. However, although we use a vast dataset with more than 50,000 
observations, the fact is that even more information is needed. Consideration of 
the introduction of works councils and the lags of these values would 
unfortunately greatly reduce the number of usable observations with positive 
values for the introduction of works councils in former years. However such 
variables are needed to infer the long-run effects of newly adopted works 
councils.  
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